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I. INTRODUCTION
Within the last two years, the Fund has given extensive consideration
to the question of whether the liberalization of capital movements should be
pursued through an amendment of its Articles of Agreement and, in
particular, whether the Fund's approval jurisdiction should be extended to
capital movements. In this respect, a number of staff papers were
presented to the Executive Board, examining the framework of a possible
amendment and some of the more detailed related legal issues. In
September 1998, the Interim Committee stated:
* These comments are made in a personal capacity. They draw extensively on two earlier
presentations: (1) F. Gianviti, IMF Seminar on Liberalization of Capital Movements, March 10,
1998, and (2) R. Leckow, IMF Singapore Training Institute Seminar on Capital Movements, June 5,
1998.
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 5:407
[t]he Committee invites the Executive Board to complete its work
on a proposed amendment of the Fund's Articles that would make
the liberalization of capital movements one of the purposes of the
Fund, and extend, as needed, the Fund's jurisdiction through the
establishment of carefully-defined and consistently applied
obligations regarding the liberalization of such movements.
Safeguards and transitional arrangements are necessary for the
success of this major endeavor. Flexible approval policies will
have to be adopted. In both the preparation of an amendment to
its Articles and in its implementation, the members' obligations
under other international agreements will be respected. In
pursuing this work, the Committee expects the IMF and other
institutions to cooperate closely.'
At the same time, the Asian crisis has broadened into a world crisis,
and the Fund has been devoted to dealing with evolving events, as well as
seeking to understand their implications2 and taking steps towards a
stronger international monetary system.'
Nonetheless, the new significance of international capital movements
must be recognized. As put recently, "[The explosive growth of
international financial transactions and international capital flows is one of
the single most profound and far-reaching economic developments of the
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Accordingly, govern-
ments, international organizations, private market participants and
informed observers must deal with the phenomenon. Several complex and
fundamental issues need to be raised. Factually, what do capital
movements involve? What policy responses at the national and
international level are to be recommended? What legal structures and
prescriptions are necessary? Finally, what form of international
cooperation is appropriate?
The Fund will have a direct involvement in these matters. Even under
the existing Articles and within its present functions, the Fund is intimately
concerned with capital movements. In particular, the Fund already has the
nominal responsibility for the oversight of the international monetary
system (Article IV § 3(a)). In addition, the way in which countries deal
1. Statement of the Interim Committee on the Liberalization of Capital Movements Under
an Amendment of the Articles, Attachment to the Commumiqu6 of the Interim Committee of the
Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund, Sept. 21, 1997. The Committee reaffirmed
its view in its Communiqu6 of Apr. 16, 1998, but no reference was made in the subsequent
Communiqu6 of Oct. 4, 1998.
2. See IMF, International Capital Markets: Development Prospects and Key Policy Issues
(September 1998), Chapters I-IV.
3. See Report of the Managing Director to the Interim Committee, Strengthening the
Architecture of the International Monetary System (Oct 1998).
4. IMF, Capital Account Liberalization: Theoretical and Practical Aspects 1 (1998).
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with capital movements has direct and profound implications for financial
stability and economic growth, in both the national and world economies.
The Fund's view remains, therefore, that capital liberalization contributes
economic benefits, although the liberalization process must be carried
forward in an orderly and properly sequenced way.
In this context, my comments relate to the Fund's legal structure,
present and potential. First, I will summarize briefly the Fund's existing
jurisdiction. Secondly, I will turn to possible changes that could be made
in order to extend that jurisdiction to capital movements. Thirdly, I will
comment briefly on some broader matters that are likely to condition the
prospect for such an expanded Fund jurisdiction.
II. -EXISTING JURISDICTION
There are two relevant aspects of existing Fund jurisdiction: (1) its
regulatory or approval jurisdiction; and (2) its general involvement in
capital movements. In various respects, the Articles distinguish between
payments for current transactions and capital movements.
A. Regulatory Jurisdiction
Article I sets the tone. Underlying as a purpose of the Fund its
assistance on the "establishment of a multilateral system of payments in
respect of current transactions between members and in the elimination of
foreign exchange restrictions that hamper the growth of world trade."5
Thus, liberalization for current transactions is a designated purpose of the
Fund. Liberalization of capital movements is not.
Under Article VIII § 2(a), members of the Fund submit to an
obligation not to impose restrictions on payments and transfers for current
international transactions without the approval of the Fund. At the same
time, members may opt to maintain and adapt existing restrictions; in that
event, only newly imposed restrictions require Fund approval (Article XIV
§ 2). An additional point is that the Fund's Articles include in the concept
of current payments elements that might otherwise be treated as capital
(Article XIX (d)).6 To that extent, the Fund's approval jurisdiction already
extends to capital movements.
The Articles further accentuate the distinction between current and
capital restrictions. Under Article VI, members may impose ("such
controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movements,") as
long as they do not restrict the making of payments and transfers for
current international transactions (Article VI § 3). In addition, the Fund
5. See supra note 2.
6. The definition of "payments for current transactions" set out in Art. XXX(d) includes:
(i) "payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for depreciation of direct
investments;" (ii) "normal short-term banldng and credit facilities;" and (iii) "moderate remittances
for family living expenses."
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may request members exercise capital controls to prevent a large or
sustained outflow of capital that could make it necessary for them to turn to
the Fund for financial assistance (Article VI § l(a)).
The distinction between current and capital is maintained in other
respects. First, the obligation to convert official balances held by other
members is confined to balances derived from current transactions (Article
VIII § 4). Secondly, the prohibition from engaging in multiple currency
practices or discriminatory currency arrangements has been confined by
interpretation to payments and transfers for current transactions (Article
VIII § 3).
B. Capital Liberalization Under the Present Articles
While the Articles contain a distinction between current payments and
capital movements in various significant respects, the Fund is nonetheless
closely involved with capital movements in the performance of its several
major functions. Accordingly, within the present Articles, the Fund has
engaged in the pursuit of capital liberalization.
First, in the conduct of its surveillance function, the Fund is mandated
to exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members
(Article IV § 3) and to oversee members' obligations, articulated in Article
IV § 1 (Article IV § 2). Of note, capital movements are part of the Article
IV surveillance process; not only was the concept of capital introduced by
the Second Amendment in 1978 (Article IV § 1), but it is specifically
recognized in the principles and procedures for Surveillance over Exchange
Rate Policies.7 In essence, however, the role of the Fund in surveillance is
essentially analytical and recommendatory; the obligations of members
under Article IV § 1 are essentially hortatory in nature, and the
surveillance process consists essentially of the rendering of policy advice
by the Fund to the member advice which the member may accept or reject.
The second major function of the Fund is the provision of financial
assistance to members for balance of payments purposes. This use of Fund
resources entails the imposition of conditionality, but the Fund's power in
this respect is not unlimited; conditionality needs to be consistent with the
Fund's Articles and must provide the Fund with sufficient safeguards. to
ensure that the Fund will be repaid (Article V § 3(a)). As already noted,
capital liberalization is not a stated purpose of the Fund, and the Articles
confer on the member the right to exercise capital controls.
In this regard, a distinction can be drawn between the imposition of
capital controls and the removal of capital controls in Fund conditionality.
For the former, the Fund has imposed controls on capital inflows as part of
its conditionality, for example, by the inclusion of performance criteria
establishing limits on public sector external borrowing. Such measures can
be justified in light of Article VI § 1. The removal of capital controls in
7. IMF Seleted Decisions, 23rd Issue 10 (1998).
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Fund conditionality is harder to justify, in that it could be viewed as an
unjustified circumvention of the right of members to control capital
movements.
The third major function of the Fund consists of technical assistance,
whereby the Fund, in response to a request by a member, is prepared to
provide "financial and technical services" (Article V §2 (b)). In recent
years, the ambit of this function has grown, extending, in particular, to
exchange policy and the exchange system. Meanwhile, the possible
constraint in Article V § 2(b) that the financial and technical services be
"consistent with the purposes of the Fund," has not been constraining, and
advice has extended to issues of capital liberalization. Within the function
of technical assistance, however, it is for the member to assess and to react
to that advice as it decides.
C. Article VIII §2(b)
Article VIII § 2(b) imposes an obligation on members relating to the
recognition of exchange control regulations of other members.
Specifically, members have undertaken not to enforce in their territories
exchange contracts involving the currency of any other member, if those
contracts are contrary to the exchange controls of the other member that
are consistent with the Fund's Articles.
This provision has been a fertile source of legal commentary. National
courts have diverged widely in their interpretations and applications of the
provision. Some observers have suggested that a formal Fund
interpretation would clarify matters, but such an interpretation has not been
forthcoming.
With reference to the application of the provision to capital controls,
the view could be taken that such measures would be included in the term
"regulations maintained or imposed consistently with [the Articles]."
Recently, however, the German courts held that Article VIII § 2(b) should
reflect the scope of Article VIII § 2(a), and thus be restricted to exchange
restrictions on current transactions!
III. OUTLINE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT
As the existing jurisdiction of the Fund is the starting point for
consideration of a possible amendment for capital movements, the analogy
to the current provisions and practice is an appealing one. In summary, a
general prohibition on restrictions on capital movements, the concept of
approval of newly imposed restrictions in order to create consistency with
the Fund's Articles, and transitional provisions for existing restrictions. At
this stage of the discussion of an amendment, a wide variety of approaches
could be considered. This spectrum includes the following:
8. See Johann Has v. Raiffeisen - Volksbank Isen e.g., XI ZR 16/93; Bank for Economic
Projects-Minerabank v. Wolfgang van Betteray, II ZR 216/92, WM 1994, 54,56.
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A. Amendment of the Fund's Purposes
The most basic form of an amendment would be to add the
liberalization of capital movements as a purpose of the Fund in Article I, as
endorsed by the April 1998 Interim Committee communique.
Under such an amendment, the orientation of the Fund's interest in
capital liberalization would be emphasized. While lacking a general
obligation on all members, the most direct effect would be to legitimate
capital liberalization through the use of the Fund's conditionality, during
the period of a Fund-supported program.
Several consequential changes might accompany an amendment of the
Fund's purposes. First, to avoid an apparent contradiction, the express
right of members to maintain controls under Article VI § 3 would
presumably be eliminated (though this by itself would not prevent members
from resorting to such controls as a manifestation of sovereignty).
Secondly, in terms of Fund financing, the present restriction on the use of
Fund financing for large or sustained capital outflows (Article VI §1)
might be reconsidered though, in so doing, the capacity of the Fund to
meet an increased demand for its financial assistance would have to be
weighed. Thirdly, the preamble and obligations of Article IV §1 could be
re-thought though the risks associated with re-visiting that provision,
arrived at only after difficult negotiations, might argue against such an
initiative.
B. Payments and Transfers for Capital Transactions
The current Article VIII § 2(a) provision on "payments and transfers
for current international transactions" could be reflected, so that there
would be a prohibition on restrictions for payments and transfers associated
with capital transactions. The present provision is confined to outward
payments and transfers only for capital movements. This could be
extended to inward capital flows. (At the same time, the existing
jurisdiction for current payments and transfers might be expanded
similarly.)
C. Capital Transactions
The Fund's existing jurisdiction relates to restrictions on the making
of payments and transfers for current international transactions, not to the
underlying transactions themselves (with one limited exception, namely,
short-term banking and credit facilities: Article XIX (d)). The reason for
this limitation was well understood. There was to be another global
international organization that would have jurisdiction over current account
transactions, that is, the International Trade Organization (a
complementarily put into effect by the GATT and continued by the WTO).
It can be argued, therefore, that a broader approach should be adopted
in the case of capital movements, in that there is no existing universal
international organization charged with liberalization of capital
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transactions. In support of this view, it can be seen that, were the
expanded jurisdiction to be limited to payments and transfers, the impact
would be marginal, in that most capital restrictions are imposed upon the
underlying transactions, not on the payments and transfers related to such
transactions. In addition, it seems that other international organizations
and agreements with competence over capital movements do not distinguish
between underlying transactions and payments and transfers.
D. Concept of Restriction
On the assumption that the amendment would extend to underlying
transactions, the concept of restriction will need to be defined or
anticipated. Given that the Fund does not at the moment have jurisdiction
over underlying transactions, there is no developed practice in the Fund at
this point. Based on other experience, however, an operative principle
could be developed to the effect that a restriction would consist of an
official measure that treats international transactions less favorably than
domestic transactions. Inevitably, this generality will need elucidation in
practical situations; for example, while a national measure may formally
treat domestic and international transactions in the same fashion, in the
particular circumstances international transactions might in fact be treated
less favorably.
E. Exceptions to Jurisdiction
Despite the general coverage of the possible amendment, specific
types of capital transactions might be excluded, totally, in part, or subject
to later inclusion by appropriate action. For example, an important
question is whether inward direct investment (that is, direct investment
made by non-residents with residents) should be excluded, and whether its
inclusion could be considered at a later time.
An argument can be made for the exclusion from Fund jurisdiction of
certain measures, such as inward direct investment, that are not directly
linked to the Fund's interest in balance of payments and macroeconomic
management. An alternative, however, would be to exclude inward direct
investment from Fund jurisdiction initially but provide that it could be
activated later (in whole or in part, or with certain thresholds) by a special
majority of the Board of Governors, and so put into effect without further
amendment.
Members would need to be assured of their right to maintain existing
restrictions. As with the present jurisdiction over current account
payments, countries could expect to rely on transitional provisions to
maintain and adapt restrictions without breaching the obligations of the
Articles. A related question arises to what extent, and by what
mechanisms, would a member be persuaded or pressured to adopt the full
obligations of capital liberalization and thus terminate its reliance on
transitional provisions?
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F. Approval Policies
As with the current Articles, a member might be able to impose
restrictions on capital movements in certain situations, for example, for
restrictions introduced for balance of payments reasons, for prudential
reasons, and for reasons of national security. Given national sensitivity on
these matters, however, it is possible that members will require additional
assurance before signing on to a proposed amendment in terms of detailed
and relatively objective criteria to be stipulated in the Articles, rather than a
general power of approval.
G. Article VIII § 2(b)
An amendment to expand the Fund's jurisdiction in the interests of
capital liberalization would raise the question of whether to put teeth into
Article VIII § 2(b).
Views and possibilities differ, especially given the diversity of national
interpretation of the existing provisions, on the one hand, and the greater
impact of a strengthened provision on the enforcement of contractual
arrangements, on the other hand. For instance, the provision could be
retained in its present form, or even abolished.
A further possibility would be to amend Article VIII § 2(b) in order to
provide a mechanism to facilitate orderly international debt reorganizations.
Specifically, a new Article VIII § 2(b) could provide a means of imposing
a stay on the enforcement of creditor claims during the time in which a
member's adjustment program is being supported by a Fund arrangement.
IV. SOME BROADER ISSUES
The choice of the scope and approach of an amendment to extend the
Fund's jurisdiction will be conditioned by a number of factors. Let me
mention three of them.
A. Type of Obligation
In designing an amendment to expand the Fund's jurisdiction, the type
of obligation has to be considered.
First, a preliminary question is whether it would be better to specify
the nature of the liberalization obligations or, alternatively, to confer the
authority to establish such obligations on the Fund to be identified and
activated at a later date. A number of treaties follow the latter approach. It
rests, however, on the principle of unanimity for decisions (e.g., the
OECD). In the Fund, however, that approach is not permissible; under the
Articles neither the Board of Governors nor the Executive Board possesses
the authority to establish obligations though they can interpret and enforce
obligations.
Secondly, there is a pervasive question of the appropriate specificity
of the new provisions. Notably, the existing Articles are often rendered in
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terms of general principles and concepts. For example, the concept of
exchange restriction in Article VIII § 2(a), while relatively general in its
content, was left to be filled out by later decision and practice. Similarly,
the Articles does not specify the policies or criteria to control the Fund's
approval of exchange measures subject to the Fund's approval jurisdiction.
For capital liberalization, however, given the sensitivity of members, there
may be a bias towards a more detailed description of such determinative
concepts, without which members might be unwilling to choose to support
an amendment.
B. Enforcement of Obligations
Till now, the identification, invocation, application and enforcement of
members' obligations in the Fund take a different tack to that of some other
organizations, such as the WTO. In the Fund, enforcement is not
adversarial, as between members, and contains few formal and evidentiary
procedures. Instead, they are based on the application of relatively
objective criteria relating to the actual exchange measures and the practices
of the governments. Significantly, also, the Articles do not envisage
retaliatory action of members; rather, enforcement is for the Fund itself, by
means of representation, peer pressure, conditionality, and sanctions. A
relevant question arises, therefore, whether the extension of Fund
jurisdiction to capital movements, given its nature and scope, would
require a different system for enforcement.
C. Conflicting Treaty Obligations
The relationship between the amended Articles and other treaties that
deal with capital movements is a further important matter for consideration.
First, it could be expected that the extension of Fund jurisdiction
would need to seek accommodation with other international organizations
and treaty regimes dealing with capital liberalization. One way to achieve
this end would be to provide specifically in the amendment that Fund
jurisdiction would be subject to obligations in other treaties.
Secondly, to the extent that other treaties provide for a more favorable
regime for foreign investments than the amended Articles, a question of
discrimination among members would arise. In response, a "most favored
nation" type of clause could be considered.
Thirdly, while in general a conflict of rights and obligations between
different treaty regimes should be avoided, a solution would be for other
treaty regimes to defer to the Fund's specialized function of regulating and
approving restrictions on capital movements, so that the Fund's approval of
restrictions would make them consistent with those other treaties. (See, in
this regard, Articles 11 and 12 of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services.)
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